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Corruption has always been present in society and structures of state but the theoretical as 
well as the practical understanding of corruption has evolved only in the recent past. Corruption 
has either been understood as a structural problem of politics and economics or as a cultural and 
moral problem that makes the study of corruption multi-disciplinary. Notwithstanding this 
complex understanding of political corruption, theorists have generally identified lack of 
accountability as one of the major reasons for explaining political corruption. In a democratic 
setting this implies the failure of political institutions in a society. 
At the outset it is important to understand that lack of accountability and failure of political 
institutions results from an imbalance between the processes of acquisition of political power, 
rights associated with these positions of power, and rights of the people to control the use of that 
power. This imbalance has to be disciplined by the institutions that represent the rights of the 
people, failure of which leads to corruption. Recent research on corruption has made an attempt 
to relate corruption to various other phenomena or processes and has tried to understand the 
struggle against corruption in terms of broader process of democratization, which is reflected in 
the “neo-classical” approach towards corruption.  One of the attempts of this paper is to 
understand the relationship between political institutions and corruption, which is important for 
an analysis of how we might root out corruption. Acknowledging the importance of political 
institutions in tackling political corruption, the study also presents its limitations by pointing out 
that existence and creation of political institutions are not enough to address political corruption 
and there is a need to look beyond institutions. There is a need to design a control mechanism that 
can prove to be effective in addressing political corruption, which need not be in the form of a 
new institution, rather, it can be found in the effective participation of the people.  
A successful fight against corruption requires a critical probe into the link between the 
political institutions and corruption and there is need to acknowledge the link between reducing 
corruption and the broader process of democratization. It is important to understand that 
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corruption takes away the rights of the people as citizen of the nation. Corruption puts at stake the 
basic rights of life, liberty, equality and dignity, which constitute the basic human rights of people. 
High levels of corruption in any society disable the state from fulfilling its duties to respect, protect 
and fulfill the human rights of its citizen. Corruption undermines the ability of states to comply 
with its human rights obligations because it erodes the capacity and confidence of a state to deliver 
services to the public. Corruption not only depletes the resources available for public spending it 
also weakens government’s ability to deliver on various other services like health, education and 
welfare services. In such a situation economically and politically disadvantaged suffer from the 
consequences of corruption as they are largely depended on public goods. With such consequences 
of corruption there can be no two opinions to the fact that its existence in a democracy makes a 
state less democratic. 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL CORRUPTION: DEFINITIONAL DEBATES 
 
The meaning, nature and definition of corruption have always been a matter of debate and 
have evolved over time, with classical conceptions of corruption focused mainly on the moral 
understandings, whereas modern conceptions conceiving it mainly in terms of specific actions of 
specific individuals (JOHNSTON, 2001). Though corruption is always identified as a serious threat 
to any society, it never received due attention from the point of view of eradicating the problem. 
Corruption has received serious attention only in the recent past. One of the reasons as to why 
corruption did not get due attention in the past is that corruption was seen as a universal and 
inevitable phenomenon which could not be tackled rationally. Another reason is the argument put 
forward by the neo-liberal economists that corruption was considered as the result of proactive 
regulated state and its commitment to planned development. For them a socially corrupt act is only 
a result of scarcity conditions created by the state which can be tackled by addressing this issue of 
state’s role in economic management. Another set of argument is given by the “revisionists” who 
believe that some form of corruption may prove to be helpful in governance and development.  So 
there can be different ways to explain the causes and consequences of corruption. There is Marxian 
perspective that conceives corruption as a system of general social principle and relation in a 
community which can be explained in terms of the interest of the dominant class, there is 
sociological perspective that considers corruption context specific with different societies 
experiencing different forms and degrees of corruption, there is techno-bureaucratic perspective 
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which sees corruption as a result of over-regulated state and there is political perspective that tries 
to draw a distinction between bureaucratic corruption and political corruption and calls for the 
inclusion of the struggle against corruption in the political agenda. Bureaucratic corruption in this 
view involves those acts of bureaucrats in which they accept bribes for illegal acts or for “speedy 
works” to meet their personal needs or greed. In political corruption, apart from the above acts, 
politicians try to seek legitimacy for their corrupt behavior as something that is an integral part of 
political competition and hence challenges the very essence of the political process (PANDEY, 
2001). So corruption, viewed from this perspective, is damaging to the democratic institutions. 
Trying to understand corruption in a democracy, Mark E. Warren (2004) points out that 
the topic of corruption has been absent from democratic theory and the reason behind this is that 
there have been missing links between concepts of corruption and democracy. Warren argues that 
corruption is a form of harmful exclusion of those who have a claim to inclusion and hence 
involves an unjustifiable disempowerment. Warren is trying to provide, what he calls a democratic 
conception of corruption and believes that corruption in a democracy usually indicates a deficit of 
democracy, breaking the link between people and the state and reducing the domain of public 
action by adversely affecting peoples’ power to influence the collective decision-making process. 
He argues, “corruption in this way diminishes the horizons of collective actions and in so doing 
shrinks the domain of democracy. Corruption undermines democratic capacities of association 
within civil society by generalizing suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity.” (WARREN, 2004, 
p. 329) The conceptual link between corruption and democracy can be identified if corruption is 
seen as “a form of duplicitous and harmful exclusion of those who have a claim to inclusion in 
collective decision and actions.” (Ibid, p. 329) 
A democratic conception of corruption must be broad enough to widen the area where the 
notion of political corruption applies so that political corruption includes not only state but also 
any institution that has control over the resources that people need or want. This is important, as 
Warren points out, because “the corrupt use their control over resources to achieve gains at the 
expense of those excluded in collective decision making or organization of collective actions.” 
(Ibid., p. 333) However he clarifies that though every form of corruption involves exclusion, every 
form of exclusion cannot be considered corruption. “Democratic corruption”, according to 
Warren, “resides not in greed per se, but in serving this greed by excluding those affected from the 
processes of collective decision making that might justify the actions.” (Ibid., p. 333) 
It has become a general practice that the politicians try to deflect criticisms on account of 
widespread corruption by arguing that corruption is not systemic but is accidental and try to 
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socialize people in such a way that they start viewing corruption as a problem of just a few officials 
or leaders rather than a systemic problem. Thus, “one plausible failure of the political market-place 
arises if the minimal relevant knowledge about corruption is not available.” (KURER, 2001, p.79) 
People are not able to assess the effects of corruption properly and focus is generally on the 
individuals who perform the corrupt acts, which problematizes the general understanding of the 
nature of political corruption. In the cases of political corruption, attention is not given to the 
victims of the corrupt act i.e. those who get affected by the corrupt action and the focus is generally 
on those who perform the act and hence corruption is not seen as anti-people or anti-human, it is 
seen only as a violation of abstract principles (TRIPATHY, 1996, pp. 5-10). Ratnakar Tripathy 
argues that our notions of corruption are highly moralistic and idealistic. He is of the opinion that 
“when we take a public stance we distance ourselves from the practical view and assume an idealist 
posture as guardians of public morality.” (Ibid., p. 10) This notion neglects the visualization of the 
effects of corruption. Tripathy argues, “we have not set for ourselves a chain of causation which 
links political corruption with public suffering” (Ibid., p. 9), and hence “corruption unfortunately 
has an aura of ‘victimless violence’.” (Ibid., p. 9) Corruption sustains because people relate it to just 
few leaders or officers and do not consider it systemic and people believe that by getting the corrupt 
out of the office the task is completed, which is a false belief from which people need to come out. 
The different perspectives on political corruption makes it a complex phenomenon, which can be 
understood in different ways and help in understanding the causes and consequences of corruption 
from different stand points, making the task of defining corruption even more difficult and 
complex. Political corruption has got a complex nature and cannot be defined through a single 
statement. However, it may be understood in terms of the actors involved and also in terms of the 
purpose of the corrupt behavior, which involves private or group enrichment or power 
preservation. Often these two forms are connected and sometimes political corruption involves 
both the processes, i.e. on the one hand there is accumulation of wealth and on the other hand 
there is misuse of public money for political purposes.  When the public officials misuse their 
power to extract from private sector, government revenues and from economy in general, political 
corruption takes the form of accumulation. Such processes of accumulation are called extraction, 
embezzlement, rent-seeking, plunder, kleptocracy (‘rule by thieves’), as the case may be. On the 
other hand, when the extracted resources are used for political purposes like power preservation, 
it takes the form of favouratism and patronage politics which may include distribution of these 
resources to build loyalty and political support that may involve buying votes and other benefits 
through favours in different forms. Political corruption can be distinguished from administrative 
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or bureaucratic corruption as it is witnessed at the highest level of political system. In a report on 
corruption research it is argued that  
the distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption is rather ambiguous. It 
depends on the Weberian separation of politics from administration, which has proved 
difficult to implement in most poor countries and hence is difficult to observe. The 
distinction is nevertheless important in analytical terms (ANDVIG, 2000, p. 19). 
 
Bureaucratic corruption takes place at the implementation side of politics, whereas political 
corruption usually takes place at the formulation end of politics, where policies regarding 
distribution of nation’s wealth are made. What can be more damaging is when these two work 
together to perpetuate each other. 
 Any attempt to understand political corruption must confront the task of defining the 
concept. Varieties of definitions have been employed to explain corruption but none of them 
explains it in a holistic manner. Contemporary social science definitions of corruption can be 
categorized within three strands explaining corruption by relating it to either public office, or to 
demand supply and exchange concepts of economic theory, or to the concept of public interest. 
These are called the pubic-office centered definitions, the market-centered definitions, and the 
public-interest centered definitions respectively. 
The public-office centered definitions define corruption as any deviation from normal 
duties of a public role because of private regarding gains. J. S. Nye’s definition of corruption well 
illustrates the public-office definition which is as follows: 
Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules 
against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence. This includes such behavior as 
bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism 
(bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation 
(illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses) (Cf. HEIDENHEIMER, 
1970, p. 5) 
The market-centered definitions consider a corrupt public official is the one who regards his/her 
public office as a business, trying to maximize the income and is reflected in Robert Tilman’s 
definition of corruption who states that: 
Corruption involves a shift from a mandatory pricing model to a free-market model. The 
centralized allocative mechanism, which is the ideal of modern bureaucracy, may break down in 
the face of serious disequilibrium between supply and demand. Clients may decide that it is 
worthwhile to risk the known sanctions and pay the higher costs in order to be assured of receiving 
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the desired benefits. When this happens bureaucracy ceases to be patterned after the mandatory 
market and takes on characteristics of the free market (Cf. HEIDENHEIMER, 1970, p. 5)  
In the same vein Van Klaveren goes on to state that “a corrupt public servant regards his 
public office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maximize. The office then becomes 
a “maximizing unit”. The size of his income depends upon the market situation and his talents for 
finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve.” (Cf. HEIDENHEIMER, 1970, 
p. 5) Some theorists have argued that market-centered definition cannot be used to define 
corruption. Mark Philp (1997) argues that though the market-centered definition may be one way 
of understanding corruption, it is certainly not a way of defining it. According to Philp “what 
defines an act as corrupt is not that it is income maximizing, but that it is income maximizing in a 
context where prior conceptions of public office and the principles for its conduct define it as 
such.” (PHILP, 1997, p. 27) He is of the opinion that all the cases of income maximizing need not 
be corrupt and hence to consider any interest or income-maximizing act as corrupt, it requires 
construction of public office and the public interest which are based on certain norms and values, 
which provide certain normative constraints on income maximizing. 
The public-interest centered definition conceives corruption as violations of common 
interest for special advantage. The public interest-centered definition is exemplified by Carl 
Friedrich who argues: 
The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged 
with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or 
other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the 
rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests (Cf. HEIDENHEIMER, 1970, p. 
6). 
These different understandings of corruption have made political corruption a complex 
phenomenon. A careful examination of the above definitions would reveal that public office and 
public interest are intimately connected. The open character of politics demands the politicians to 
be guided by public interest. Politicians are not simply to fulfill promises made to electorate rather 
politics is also about the projection of conceptions of public interest. The idea, therefore, should 
not be to strive for formulating one line definition of political corruption, as it requires identifying 
proper conception of the public interest.  
Thus, these definitions are vague until certain norms are identified to distinguish between 
corrupt and non-corrupt acts. Any normative judgment about political corruption requires a point 
of view and a standard of “goodness” and the definition of political corruption should be based 
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on certain conception of non-corrupt politics, which requires identification of proper standards to 
distinguish between corrupt and non-corrupt acts.  In a democracy usually these standards are 
democratic principles and values which form the basis to identify politically corrupt acts. 
 
 
CORRUPTION AS VIOLATION DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES: EFFECTS OF 
CORRUPTION IN A DEMOCRACY 
 
Over the ages the relationship between individuals and states has changed and therefore 
our expectations of what “the state” or “the individual” has to do have also changed. Earlier it was 
the state that defined the code of behaviour for everyone and within that established context 
corruption meant failure to behave according to that moral code. In the present context, however, 
the ruler is not expected to define morality as she/he reflects the morality of the ruled and acts 
according to the established norms and within this context corruption is linked to the behavior of 
the rulers. Michael Johnston emphasizes this idea by arguing that “corruption is today most often 
seen as an attribute of specific actions by specific individuals: those holding public positions and 
those who seek to influence them.” (JOHNSTON, 2001, p. 13) He further draws upon a more 
recent school of thought, which he calls “neo-classical” approach, that links corruption not just 
with the actions of the individuals but rather it believes that it is a deeper problem with politics. 
Though this approach agrees to the basic idea that corruption involves abuse of public roles and 
resources for private benefit, it does not specify a precise category of behavior as corrupt. The idea 
of corruption as a problem more with politics has been further explored by Dennis Thompson 
who believes that an act can be considered corrupt by virtue of its ability to damage the democratic 
process. These acts, Thompson believes, are mediated by the political processes and therefore he 
calls it “mediated corruption” (Cf. Ibid., p. 22).  This idea of “mediated corruption” takes the 
notion of corruption beyond the conventional idea that limits the idea of corruption to bribery and 
extortion and in this sense it is different from the general concept of corruption which includes 
three main elements — a public official gain, a benefit received by a private citizen and improper 
connection between the gain and the benefit. “Mediated corruption” differs in all these three 
elements, as for Thompson, the gain that a politician receives is political and not personal and it is 
not illegitimate in itself, as in the case of conventional corruption. He further points out that the 
benefit received by the private citizen by the public official is not in itself improper, what is 
improper is the way the public official provides the benefit. Finally, he points out that the 
Conceptualizing Political Corruption In a Democracy:  
A Contested Domain – Páginas: 90-114. 
97 |  
REPOL | Revista Estudos de Política, Campina Grande, vol. 1, nº 2, 2012. 
 
connection between gain and benefit is improper not because the public official provided the 
benefit with a corrupt motive, but because it damaged the democratic process. “In each of these 
elements”, Thompson argues, “the concept of mediated corruption links the acts of individual 
officials to qualities of the democratic process” (Ibid., p. 22). Thompson further explains that all 
personal gains are not wrong, only a certain kind of personal gain is wrong and that too not because 
it is a personal gain but because of its effects on the system — because they avoided the democratic 
process. The democratic process to which Thompson regularly refers involves certain values like 
representation, accountability, open debate and equality (Ibid., p. 23). The points explored by 
Jhonston and Thompson explore a broad aspect of corruption in which the acts that avoid the 
democratic process and overlook the democratic values like equality and open debate, can be 
considered as politically corrupt acts. Such acts lead to the exclusion of a certain section of the 
population, which makes corruption an important aspect to be dealt in any democracy. 
 
 
HOW DOES CORRUPTION THRIVES IN A DEMOCRACY? A THIRD WORLD 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
It is now clear that corruption in a democracy undermines democratic structures as well as 
democratic values. Focus on effects of corruption in a democracy helps in better conceptualization 
of the concept and in understanding the fact that there is a kind of inverse relationship between 
corruption and democracy which means that as corruption increases democracy is undermined and 
as democracy is strengthened opportunities of corruption are minimized.  However, whether there 
is a negative correlation between corruption and democracy is something on which theorists have 
different opinions. Some recent studies of Transparency International and Freedom House on the 
effect of regime type on levels of corruption, revealed that there is a negative relationship between 
democratization and corruption but this correlation is not very strong as this is a statistical 
relationship and not necessarily a causal one (AMUNDSEN, 1999). Paldam (1999) too believes 
that direct effect of democratization on corruption is spurious. In his study he found that 
corruption would generally decrease with increasing levels of democracy, but this covariance 
depends upon the level of democracy or upon the stage of democratic transition. In the similar 
vein, through a cross national study on corruption, Daniel Treisman (2000) came up with the 
hypothesis that democratic countries with freedom of press and vigorous civil society can have 
greater ability to expose corruption and thus will have lower levels of corruption, as freedom of 
Pawan Kumar 
98 |  
REPOL | Revista Estudos de Política, Campina Grande, vol. 1, nº 2, 2012. 
 
 
press and association help in monitoring public officials and exposing abuse of power. Interestingly 
the study found that the relationship between democracy and corruption can be established not by 
just looking at the present condition of a country’s political system or by just looking at the fact 
that a country is democratic in the present time. How corrupt a country is, can be decided only by 
looking at whether or not it has been democratic for decades. He is of the opinion that countries 
with long duration of democracy had some impact on reducing corruption. Michael Coppedge and 
others’ approach to conceptualize and measure democracy brings out the importance of historical 
approach and argue that conceptualizing democracy in the present time and its future is depended 
upon a sound understanding of how democracy has shaped till now or knowing the past of 
democracy. They believe that historical data-gathering is important and essential for 
conceptualizing and measuring democracy (COPPEDGE et. al, 1999). But the question that 
emerges now is how corruption sustains in a democracy? India, which is one of the largest 
democracies in the world, is grappled with the problem of corruption which forces us to think 
whether there are some structural faults in the functioning of democracy that helps corruption to 
survive. This section is devoted to investigate this aspect from the third world perspective and 
examine whether third world provides some special context as a breeding ground of corruption.  
One of the main concerns in the present third world democratic theories is the problem of 
democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation requires not only legitimate and 
institutionalized governance, but also civil society participation in the process of governance. There 
are basically two major schools of thought in the discourse of democratic consolidation. One is the 
institutional approach, which focuses on the performance of institutions and tries to identify the 
best procedures and institutions within the constitutional framework to deal with the problem. 
Another approach is the political culture approach which dwells on people’s attitudes and values 
with respect to the democratic governance, culture and practice. According to Larry Diamond 
(1999), consolidation involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalize democratic 
politics and narrow its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, 
development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and most 
urgently it requires political institutionalization. According to Diamond (1999), consolidation takes 
place in two dimensions of norms and behavior and at three different levels. The elites comprising 
of decision makers, political activists, organizational leaders, are at the highest level and also most 
important in democratic consolidation. At the intermediate level are the parties, organizations and 
movements that have their own beliefs and norms. At the bottom is the mass public that helps in 
consolidation by accepting democracy as the best form of government in principle. Developing 
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countries face the problem of bringing about such changes. According to Samuel Huntington, the 
third wave democracies face the problem of sustainability and consolidation in different areas, one 
of them being the systemic problem that emanates from the internal workings of a democracy, 
such as centralization of power, personalization rather than institutionalization of politics, 
hegemonic politics and domination by vested economic interests (Cf. Ibid., p. 64). 
Corruption in developing nations can be attributed to the social situations that make 
corruption more likely. Developing nations provided the social context where the governments in 
most of the cases acquired control over the disposal of posts and privileges and they had to face 
the electorates, mostly poor, who could be easily influenced by material incentives. Corruption is 
rampant in developing nations because the rate of change (social, economic, and political) in these 
nations is more rapid and there is clash between old and new values (SCOTT, 1969). Developing 
countries lack well-developed structures for expressing and combining important political interests. 
The effect of this lack of interest structures is that political demands that originate outside the elite 
class have minimal influence on legislation, which is one of the reasons behind little or no influence 
of the public on the ‘output’ of the government. Demands of the people or groups reach the 
political system only at the implementation stage and not before the laws are passed. The influence 
before the passage of legislation is called ‘pressure group politics’ and the influence at the 
enforcement stage often involves ‘corruption’. For example, agitation of peasant groups through 
their union for reduction in land tax is different than making an illegal monetary contribution to 
the concerned officer for avoiding their land taxes. The latter influences the outcome of 
government policy. In this sense corruption is not just a reflection of the failure of the formal 
political system to meet the demands of important sectors; it is also representative of the efforts of 
individuals and groups to mould the political system according to their wishes.  People who feel 
that their interests are ignored by the formal political system often take up the informal ways to 
influence which is corruption. 
 Electoral competition is one area in a political system that widens the arena of political 
influence. Since people’s vote makes a difference in the affairs of those who seek power and 
manage the state, the power-holders and power-seekers adopt different methods to influence the 
voters. 
If class consciousness and ideological concerns are of importance to the electorate, 
promises of satisfactory policies may be all that is required in the way of inducements. 
But if, as in most developing nations, the desire for immediate particularistic gains 
predominates, leaders of political parties will find it more difficult to provide appropriate 
inducements without violating formal standards of public probity. In the short run, at 
least, competitive political parties are more likely to respond to the incentives that 
motivate their clientele than to transform the nature of these incentives” (Ibid., p. 332).  
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In this sense the control over votes has proved ineffective in ensuring accountability of the 
political leaders. The major political resource today is control over coercive force and not control 
over votes. Thus it is not always true that people vote because they want to replace the corrupt 
leader as there can be several other reasons why people vote in a democracy. Sometimes people 
vote because of the material incentives it supplies. The ordinary voters desire immediate material 
rewards and therefore they vote for those who can give them maximum favour. When voters think 
that their best interests are not being served by the political system, they may support a corrupt 
politician who serves their interest rather than an honest politician who represents others as well. 
Such assumptions rest on the belief that voters are well aware about the nature of corruption as 
well as its effects, which is not true in reality because voters are ignorant about the effects of 
corruption and hence they are not able to assess the effects of corruption correctly which makes 
them falsely believe that corruption serves their material interest. 
The most important factor that leads to political corruption in a democracy, according to 
Oskar Kurer, is the “barrier to entry into the political market place” (KURER, 2001, p. 76), which 
helps a corrupt regime to hold on to power and thus leaving no option for the voters to go for 
non-corrupt parties. The cost factor plays a vital role for competing in politics because if entry into 
politics would involve lower cost then it would be easier for a new party to hold the same position 
as held by the older party. Kurer is of the opinion that “after a corrupt regime has established itself, 
barriers to entry may help to keep it in power” (Ibid). However, he further states that barrier to 
entry should not be considered as systemic element of democracy. They are only distortions of 
democracy and “it is not democracy that causes corruption, but its malfunctioning” (Ibid). 
 
 
POPULAR APPROACHES TO TACKLE POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
 
Reasons for the existence of corruption are many and so are the ways suggested for tackling 
it. Ades and Di Tella (1997) propose three possible approaches to reduce corruption. First, is a 
“layer’s” approach which talks about strengthening laws and their proper enforcement. Layer’s 
approach increases the cost and risks associated with corruption, as it focuses on punishment of 
the corrupt. Second, is a “businessman’s” approach which is in favour of giving proper incentives 
to public officials which would reduce their temptation to engage in corrupt activities. One way of 
providing such incentive is to provide higher wages. A businessman’s approach would reduce the 
incentives of corruption as the motivation for engaging in corrupt act is reduced by providing 
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different kinds of incentives to the public officials. Third, is an “economist’s” approach that 
advocates increasing competition so that opportunities for exploitation in different transactions 
can be minimised. Economist’s approach would reduce opportunities for corruption, as 
competition reduces the chances of abuse of power. It is important to study some cases of 
successes and failures in the anti-corruption reform process. The following sections provide an 
account of different approaches employed in different parts of the world to address corruption. It 
presents a comparative study of why certain reforms were successful in a specific country and why 
some countries could not successfully fight corruption which will help in providing a wider 
perspective to examine democratic institutions fail to tackle political corruption in India. 
 
 
THE POWER-SHARING APPROACH 
  
Some theorists consider the idea of power-sharing as one of the effective ways to check 
abuse of power, as they see mutual surveillance as a counterbalance to political decay, such as 
bribery and corruption. Robert Dahl preferred to call the power-sharing democracy as “Madisonian 
democracy” as it was Madison who warned that if power is concentrated there is always a risk of 
its abuse and hence concentration of power must be avoided. He did not accept regular election 
and internal checks like conscience, attitudes and personality of individuals, as sufficient to provide 
necessary checks on the abuse of power, rather he insisted on external checks, through dispersion 
of power into different hands. 
Arendt Lijphart advocated power-sharing model by bringing in the idea of “consensus 
democracy” to avoid abuse of power. Different mechanisms that he thought would be instrumental 
in arriving at “consensus democracy” are “grand coalition”, “decentralisation”, “minority veto”, 
and “proportional representation.” It means that if everyone has a share in governmental power, 
there is delegation of power, minorities have a veto regarding issues concerning them and losers 
too have representation, the risk of abuse of power would be greatly minimised. He believed that 
if all are able to take part in government through their chosen representatives, then they would be 
able to ensure that no injustices are done to them. When different parties will be represented in the 
parliament and no party has a majority, they will form coalition to make the government and in 
this situation minorities will also have a say in the government. Lijphart firmly claims that the 
proportional method would counteract political corruption and hence considers proportional 
representation as the most fundamental institutional value. Though there is also a view that in a 
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majoritarian democracy, the opposition in minority provides necessary check on the abuse of 
power and with regular elections people have the opportunity to throw out the corrupt and it is 
the best way to ensure accountability, Lijphart is critical to this view, as for him, regular election is 
not an effective way to fight corruption, at least not as effective as would be in a case of “consensus 
democracy” having mutual oversight. According to him, abuse of power and corruption are less 
prevalent in consensus democracy than in majoritarian democracy. However, Lijphart’s consensus 
democracy model does not seem to provide any mechanism for ensuring accountability because if 
everyone will have a say in decision making process then it is not clear who should be held 
responsible for the decisions. It seems that for Lijphart what is more important is that the 
government should reflect popular opinion and whether people hold their leaders accountable or 
not is not important for him. 
Though theorists have considered power-sharing as an effective method to check abuse of 
power, empirical evidence suggest just the opposite. One such case where the power-sharing model 
failed is the case of Italy where both proportional and majoritarian systems were tested and proved 
to be ineffective in tackling political corruption. Italy practiced proportionalism with a firm belief 
that dispersing power into many hands reduces the risk of abuse of power which proved to be 
wrong, as in early 1990s far-reaching corruption came to light in the Italian politics. As a response 
to this crisis the Italians made transition to majoritarian democracy hoping that this would clean 
up the politics but that too proved to be ineffective. In such a situation it becomes interesting to 
explain political corruption in Italy because it was precisely to check such abuse of power that the 
principles of proportionalism and power sharing were incorporated into the constitution.  
The framers of the Italian Constitution had thought that by incorporating power-sharing 
they could guarantee a just and fair reflection of the popular will which was soon proved wrong by 
the developments that followed. Even if the largest party could not achieve majority, it could secure 
power through negotiations with other parties. In this situation there was hardly any option for 
alternative government, as there was no fear of losing office. The leaders of the parties became the 
masters of the country and the negotiations took place within this “elite cartel” that decided the 
course of action and in this way the decisions taken were not the expression of popular will. 
Governments were short lived but the same politicians returned to power on different posts. 
Gradually the negotiation process started involving bribes and benefits and corruption became 
widespread. Both voters and organisations could be bought with money or political benefits, the 
courts, police, and social insurance system were politicised, cooperation with organised crime 
deepened and the mafia became a political power factor (LEWIN, 2007, p. 105). 
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In February 1992, Mario Chiesa, a Socialist politician, was arrested for taking bribes for 
offering contracts to several companies in exchange of political support and money. This scandal 
gradually grew big and became the biggest scandal in the political history of modern Italy which 
resulted in the fall of the First Republic and the end of consensus democracy.  In a referendum in 
1993 more than 80 per cent of voters wanted a change to majority elections. Thus, the Second 
Republic with a majoritarian system came into being. However, democracy under the Second 
Republic too was fragile and it was too marked by the tradition of corruption and authoritarian 
tendencies. 
Italy’s case suggests that proportional representation is no guarantee for a clean 
government. The belief that if all had a share in power and kept watch over each other, politics 
could become cleaner, was proved wrong. The change into a majoritarian democracy too did not 
bring about any significant improvement. The abuse of power was part of both majoritarian and 
proportional system.  
 
 
THE SINGLE-AGENCY APPROACH 
 
Corruption occurs when there are sufficient incentives and opportunities to engage in 
corrupt acts and there is also very less probability of being caught and punished. So for some 
theorists effort should be to reduce or eliminate the incentives and opportunities and increase the 
risk of being caught and punished so that corruption could be controlled. In this regard government 
should try to make corruption a “high risk and low reward” activity (JING, 2011, p. 11), which can 
be possible, as some theorists argue, if a single-agency is created to look into the matters of 
corruption, which is operationally independent and able to function without fear or favour. It is 
often argued that in certain cases there can be political interference as it could be dictated from 
above regarding the cases it is going to investigate and also establishing an anti-corruption agency 
with extensive legal powers in the absence of effective oversight procedures is questioned on the 
ground that such an agency can add another layer of (ineffective) bureaucracy to the law 
enforcement sector, divert resources from existing organisations, function as a ‘shield’ to satisfy 
donors and public opinion, and even operate as a political police force. Countering such criticisms, 
supporters of single-agency approach argue that in order to overcome such difficulties and maintain 
public trust, the independence of such an agency needs to be enshrined in national legislation or 
the constitution, and it should be a criminal offence to interfere with its operational independence. 
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In reality, such anti corruption agencies require the support of other structures to do their job 
properly. According to M. Manion (2004), properly-designed and timely interventions by 
government could successfully reduce corruption and improve credibility of the government and 
in order to shift the equilibrium from “widespread corruption” to “clean government” there is 
need to have proper design of government intervention. She studies this transformation in the case 
of Singapore and Hong Kong, on the one hand, and mainland China on the other, where the 
former is an example of successful transformation and the latter gives an account of the difficulty 
in bringing out anti-corruption reforms. Manion draws upon three fundamental differences in the 
approach of anti-corruption reforms in Singapore and Hong Kong and that of mainland China. 
Firstly, Singapore and Hong Kong granted independent and absolute authority to an independent 
anti-corruption agency, while in mainland China multiple agencies were granted partial and often 
overlapping authority. Secondly, in Singapore and Hong Kong corruption is addressed at multiple 
levels attacking corruption in all forms and in all places, while in mainland China corruption was 
addressed in a piecemeal manner. Thirdly, the difference lies in different constitutional design that 
has an important influence on constraints on power. Thus, according to Manion anti-corruption 
efforts can be studied by focussing on three things — anti-corruption agency, anti-corruption 





Anti-corruption agencies are responsible to enforce anti-corruption legislations. In a 
situation where there is widespread corruption with corrupt enforcers and there is scarcity of 
enforcement resources, there emerges various obstacles in the path of anti-corruption reform and 
an independent agency can play a vital role in these circumstances. According to Manion, the ICAC 
(Independent Commission Against Corruption) in Hong Kong succeeded in overcoming these 
obstacles which enabled Hong Kong to make the “equilibrium shift” from widespread corruption 
to clean government. She further mentions that the key components of agency design that enabled 
ICAC in controlling corruption was its independence, its draconian power and adequate financial 
resources. All these three components were instrumental in efficient enforcement. The ICAC is 
independent in terms of structure, staffing, finances and power.  Similarly in Singapore the POCA 
(Prevention of Corruption Act) was strengthened and more powers were given to the officers of 
CPIB (Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau) which greatly helped in the anti-corruption 
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reform process. Manion compares this with Mainland China and points out that Mainland China 
does not have any independent anti-corruption agency. The agencies that are functioning have 
overlapping jurisdictions and unclear division of labour which often leads to routine delay in 
transforming cases for criminal investigation and consequently people develop the believe that their 
government does not have the ability and credibility to control corruption. Thus, the basic 
difference in the anti-corruption agencies in Hong Kong and Singapore taken together and 
Mainland China lies in their level of independence and effectiveness. 
 The democracy assessment of Philippines has a similar story to tell about corruption in 
Philippines. Philippines had a long history of widespread corruption, and after the restoration of 
democracy in 1986, a number of laws and policies were enacted to prevent and curtail corruption. 
The 1987 Constitution came up with a number of bodies to ensure integrity and accountability 
such as the Office of the Ombudsman was created to protect graft and corruption; Sandiganbayan, 
a special court was created for senior officials for cases involving graft and corrupt practices; the 
Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit were also institutionalised. Despite these 
laws and policies the problem persists, as the democracy assessment of Philippines demonstrates, 
because of weak enforcement. The report of the democracy assessment of Philippines came up 
with many findings to show various causes of persistence of corruption. These findings revealed 
that the range of responsibilities and functions are so wide that they often overlap and the 
environment of Philippines too does not encourage integrity. The report further revealed that 
annual declarations of assets by public servants are just formalities and in actual practice the 
properties, income and assets are never disclosed. It went on to state that the nature of anti-
corruption laws is dual, whereby high ranking officials are seldom investigated or convicted, which 
makes the enforcement of anti-corruption laws almost impossible. The report also highlighted the 
fact that election in Philippines is the main economic activity for political players and it is used as 
a means to create and consolidate core constituencies. It was further pointed out that political 
parties do not provide strong internal checks and there is absence of external control on spending, 
which make elections quite expensive activities and hence the high cost of election together with 
other contributing factors build up a perfect context for corruption to flourish, as because of 
expensive campaign process the elected officers are forced to focus primarily on the recovery of 
this expense. The study revealed that the Commission on Election is ill prepared to police campaign 
overspending and other corrupt and illegal actions and there was an impressive gap between 
electoral laws and reality (MILLARD, 2007). Thus, the experience of Mainland China and 
Philippines exemplify the failure of anti-corruption agencies in dealing with corruption, which 
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exposes the fact that merely creating anti-corruption institutions cannot be an answer for 





A public servant while acting as an economic agent calculates the costs and benefits of 
engaging in corrupt activities. Therefore, for a successful government intervention it is important 
that these interventions are aimed at reducing the corruption payoffs as well as the incentives to 
engage in corrupt activities. Hong Kong came up with a three-pronged strategy to tackle corruption 
which involved enforcement, prevention and education. Enforcement is to increase the probability 
of being caught and being punished; prevention reduces the opportunities for corruption; and 
education is to increase the moral cost of corruption. The purpose, in this sense, is to strike at the 
root causes of corruption. Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy focuses on both the incentives and 
opportunities for corruption, which has been possible by strengthening enforcement through 
POCA and CPIB. The prevention work taken up by various departments also forms part of the 
strategy. The incentives of corruption are taken care by increasing the salaries and working 
conditions. Thus, both Singapore and Hong Kong emphasised on enforcement, to increase the 
cost of corruption and on prevention, to reduce the opportunities for corruption and at the same 
time they also emphasised on reducing the incentives of corruption. 
 
 
CONSTRAINTS ON POWER 
 
It is important to realise that small-scale government interventions won’t be of much help 
unless there are some proper and systemic constraints on power. For anti-corruption reforms to 
succeed it is important that government’s commitment is respected by people and this is possible 
only within a specific context with shared understanding of government’s responsibility, which is 
possible through a constitutional design that provides constrains to all kinds of power operating 
within a political system. According to Manion, one of the basic differences between Hong Kong 
and Mainland China lies in their different constitutional designs. Countries that uphold rule of law 
would be able to put constraints on corrupt actions more effectively, which was evident in the case 
of Hong Kong and Singapore, than in countries having ambiguous laws and where legal authority 
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is politicised, as was seen in the case of Philippines. In such cases rule of law cannot become a 
meaningful constraint on the abuse of power. 
Thus, both Singapore and Hong Kong initiated a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy 
which aimed at reducing both the opportunities and incentives for corruption.  The anti-corruption 
efforts comprised of specific and non-specific measures (RAHMAN, 1986, p. 147). The specific 
measures involved activities carried out under the anti-corruption agencies and the non-specific 
measures involved administrative measures taken by various government agencies which included, 
in the case of Singapore, disciplinary proceedings by Public Service Commission, scrutiny of 
government expenditure by the Auditor General and so on (Ibid., p. 151). 
 It is important here to consider that apart from rule of law that was successful in Singapore 
and Hong Kong to curb corruption, political freedom too provides limits on the abuse of power 
which is measured on the basis of political rights and civil liberties. The former enable people to 
freely participate in the political process and the latter provides people a set of freedoms that they 
may exercise without the interference of the State. In a country where people have high degree of 
political freedom can actively participate in the political process and can empower them to monitor 
the exercise of power which in turn would help in alleviating corruption. 
 
 
THE “BIG-BANG” APPROACH 
 
Often remedies suggested to tackle corruption is thought to be a well set mechanism and 
it is believed that once it is operationalized an incremental process of change is put into a path, 
where with every step the society is taken away from corruption and with some ‘initial steps’ or 
minor institutional changes the society is put into this “path” and it is taken out of the grip of 
corruption. According to World Bank, for example, the implementation of anti-corruption policies 
requires an important entry point for anti corruption efforts. In one of the reports it is stated that 
“it is critical to begin at a point where the goals are feasible and tangible results can be realized 
within a time frame that builds support for further reforms. Small gains can provide essential levers 
to sway public and official opinion” (WORLD BANK, 2000, p. 75). Within this approach small 
and minor changes are expected to bring big changes in the political system. The proponents of 
the “big-bang” approach are critical of this point of view and are of the opinion that corruption 
cannot be tackled through minor or small changes. Bo Rothstein (2007), for example, is critical of 
the approaches that insisted for minor institutional changes and believes that there is no magical 
Pawan Kumar 
108 |  
REPOL | Revista Estudos de Política, Campina Grande, vol. 1, nº 2, 2012. 
 
 
key or institutional device for fighting systemic corruption. He is of the opinion that small changes 
are likely to aggravate the problem and what is required is a “big bang” change. The problem with 
corruption, Rothstein argues, is that it seems to be very “sticky”, which means that once a system 
gets corrupted it becomes very difficult to take it out from the grip of corruption and “once 
corruption becomes systemic and the existence of widespread corrupt practices becomes 
“common knowledge”, we seem to have a case of an extremely robust inefficient equilibrium” 
(ROTHSTEIN, 2007, p. 5). Corruption is a “sticky” problem, Rothstein points out, because there 
is no good reason for corrupt to move out of the “game” because those who are at the bottom of 
the corrupt system believe that even if they, as individuals, start behaving honestly, nothing will 
change as long as most of their colleagues do not change their behaviour  and in such situations 
collective action for the common good is impossible to establish as long as people try to maximize 
their expected utility. The implication of such an approach is that it develops an understanding that 
a corrupt system cannot be changed from below (ROTHSTEIN, 2005). 
Despite regular efforts to fight corruption, the success rate is very low and one of the 
reasons is that while leaders do have the necessary means for launching successful policies against 
corruption, they usually have no incentives to do so as they are often the ones who stand to gain 
most from rents in a corrupt system (JOHNSTON, 2005). Another reason for the difficulty in 
bringing about the change is that corruption has become a “standard way of life” and therefore 
“for the average citizen, it seems that corruption has broken down all barriers and dictates of the 
rules of life. That is not very different from saying that they interpret life in terms of corruption” 
(UNDP, 2002) and when life is viewed in terms of corruption, it takes the form of deeply 
entrenched belief system. According to Rothstein, it is not easy to change such belief systems and 
hence in order to change such deeply held systems of beliefs, something “big” and “non-
incremental” is necessary. 
Rothstein is critical of those approaches that focus merely on the structural changes and on 
reducing the incentives of corruption. A society that is committed to tackle corruption must have 
to take up at least two important questions at the outset. First, what types of structural reforms are 
necessary in order to reduce corruption?  Second, which types of processes will be successful to 
operationalize such reforms? Most research on corruption has mainly focused on the first, 
structural question suggesting to create new or to change existing institutions, while ignoring the 
second one about the change of processes. William Easterly, for example, has suggested two 
measures to tackle corruption. “First, set up quality institutions…Second, establish policies that 
eliminate incentives for corruption” (Cf. ROTHSTEIN, 2007, p. 10). Examining the effect of 
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different types of political institutions on the degree of corruption in 38 African countries, Alence 
in his Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa concluded that 
a combination of electoral competition and institutional checks and balances on executive power 
has a negative effect on the frequency of corruption. In other words, the study suggests that the 
ideas and the practices of liberal democracy work counter to corruption (Ibid). Sandholtz and 
Koetzle have shown in their study that the presence of liberal democratic institutions minimizes 
the chances of corruption. They are of the opinion that formal democratic structures facilitate 
citizen oversight and control, and in a culture characterized by democratic values, it is against 
normal behaviour to act corrupt (Ibid). According to Rothstein, such examples of anti-corruption 
strategies suggest that the problem of corruption can be solved by merely “fixing the incentives” 
(Ibid., p. 11) and when the institutions are created such that fear is greater than greed, corruption 
can be controlled. However, Rothstein is of the opinion that creating such institution is itself a 
collective action problem and it won’t be solved unless a society ceases to be dominated by corrupt 
agents. He argues that explaining corruption and providing solutions to it on the basis of some 
universal values and institutions such as transparency, democracy, independent judicial anti-
corruption agencies or “good governance” is not enough because in societies where these 
institutions function effectively accountability will automatically be facilitated and problem arises 
only when there are systematically corrupt institutions. “In the search for universal theories on 
causes and solutions concerning corruption, many researchers do not recognize the inbuilt inertia 
(or path-dependency) of corrupt institutional systems” (Ibid., p. 12).   Rothstein further argues that 
if new institutions have to be created then the question of agency becomes central and the approach 
that advocates for structural changes often ignores the kind of agents that are present and what 
strategies they use. He insists that for a successful reform process research must start from 
identifying the roles and interests of agents and broadened his idea by arguing that the research 
must begin by identifying the groups that are expected to oppose the reform and how such 
opposition can be dealt with and identifying those who can support the change and finding out the 
way they can be involved in the struggle against corruption.  
In the context of Romania, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi argues that the problem in campaigns 
against corruption is that they do not take into account the fact that corruption is rooted in “a 
particularistic political culture” in which almost all public goods are distributed on a “non-
universalist basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power within this type of society” (Cf. 
Rothstein, 2007, p. 13) and therefore systemic corruption must be understood in terms of 
“particularistic political culture”, which is at its root. “Particularistic political culture” is defined as 
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a system in which the government treats its citizen according to their status in the society which 
means that in such particularistic political culture whatever one gets depend upon our connections 
or our ability to bribe and hence within such political culture, creating some new institutions will 
not be helpful in tackling corruption. The point that is being emphasized here is that “corruption 
and similar practices are rooted in deeply held beliefs about the proper order of exchange in a 
society — personal-particularistic versus impersonal-universalistic” (Ibid., p. 14). It implies that in 
order to curb corruption political culture must move from personal particularistic to impersonal 
universalistic forms of exchanges. Rothstein points out that 
 
if an agent tries to reform a single or a small set of the institutions in a corrupt-
particularistic-limited access political culture, it will, in all likelihood, backfire since the 
new institutions will be overtaken by the corrupt networks and practices which, in its 
turn, will increase cynicism among the population and serve to de-legitimize all future 
anti-corruption efforts  (Ibid., p. 16). 
 
If an effort is made to reform one set of institutions, corruption would creep in another. It 
is important to realize that if anti-corruption measures are limited then the agents will not be 
convinced for leaving their corrupt practices and this makes Rothstein believe that doing small 
things for reducing corruption will not work; gradual reform process cannot become a panacea for 
corruption and what is required is a “Big Bang” change.  
The different approaches to tackle corruption demonstrate that any one measure to tackle 
corruption cannot prove to be effective and merely setting up of anti-corruption institutions is not 
the panacea. Even Rothstein argues that merely setting up of institutions won’t be of much help 
and there is need to have a series of changes. International literature produced by NGOs such as 
Transparency International (TI) and the United Nations Global Program Against Corruption 
(GOPAC) indicate that effective anti-corruption reforms should be a ‘home-grown’ multi-
dimensional national strategy that includes a long term, sequenced approach to entrench reforms 
that promote public integrity, i.e. reforms that promote accountability in citizens’ interaction with 
the state. They have also identified the importance of providing sufficient resources, skills, 
independence and powers to anti-corruption agencies and institutions. They propose a partnership 
approach to tackle corruption that includes all stakeholders. 
Thus, a number of conditions are required to ensure that anti-corruption reforms in any 
context are effective, sustainable and not easily subverted. These conditions need to be backed by 
having the necessary data to inform policy and strategy; comprehensive legal and institutional 
safeguards to prevent corruption and protect public interest; and, the most difficult to secure, the 
Conceptualizing Political Corruption In a Democracy:  
A Contested Domain – Páginas: 90-114. 
111 |  
REPOL | Revista Estudos de Política, Campina Grande, vol. 1, nº 2, 2012. 
 
necessary political leadership and will to tackle corruption credibly and put in place long-term 
reforms. It is clear that to be effective, national anti-corruption/integrity systems require more than 
a single agency approach and they need to be supported by an institutional matrix of legal and 
oversight systems to ensure effective prosecution of offenders. A partnership approach, including 
active engagement by civil society and the media, is also important. Above all, the reforms need to 





This paper underlines the need to understand the systemic nature of political corruption 
and focuses more on its effects rather than its manifestations. It does not seek to present any grand 
theory of political corruption, nor a watertight set of prescription for how to end corruption, rather 
it has tried to question the popular understanding of corruption that relates it to actions of few 
individuals by arguing that a more objective and useful approach is to consider political corruption 
as a systemic problem. It is also argued that institutional reform is not enough to curb political 
corruption and that there is a need to look beyond institutions. It is important to first find out 
where and what kind of reforms can be most effective in a particular context. The paper argues 
that the link between political institutions and corruption and also between politics and corruption 
is tied to the way corruption is understood and when this understanding is not well formulated, 
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Political corruption reflects a failure of political institutions in a society. One of the attempts of 
this paper is to understand the relationship between political institutions and corruption, which is 
important for a successful fight against corruption. The paper tries to theorize political corruption 
in a democracy and then discusses various approaches that are employed in different parts of the 
world to address the problem highlighting the fact that merely creating new institutions to tackle 
corruption is not the panacea. The attempt is to show that there is a gap in the popular conception 
of corruption because of which connections between corruption and democracy are not drawn. 
Corruption essentially indicates a deficit of democracy and there is need to understand that 
corruption is not just a problem of few individuals but it is more a problem of the system itself. 
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